From 4d646ef966fe0c76c51383e7e9ca8a417cca1063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 17:52:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[CRITICAL]?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20Fix=20command=20injection=20in=20github-clone.ts?=
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection and argument injection via user input `repoName` and `repoUrl` in `src/pages/api/github-clone.ts`.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could execute arbitrary shell commands on the server by passing a malicious `repoName` (e.g., `foo; rm -rf /`).
🔧 Fix: Replaced `child_process.exec` with `execFile` to bypass shell evaluation and added validation to prevent `repoName` from starting with `-` (to avoid flag injection).
✅ Verification: Ran `pnpm run check` and `pnpm test` to ensure code remains stable and passes tests. Verified fix against `src/pages/api/github-clone.ts`.

Co-authored-by: bobdivx <6737167+bobdivx@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 .jules/sentinel.md            |  4 ++++
 src/pages/api/github-clone.ts | 12 +++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .jules/sentinel.md

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..83720651
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2024-05-06 - [Critical Command Injection in git clone]
+**Vulnerability:** Command injection and argument injection in `src/pages/api/github-clone.ts`.
+**Learning:** `child_process.exec()` was used with interpolated user input (`repoUrl` and `repoName`), which allows arbitrary shell commands. Even after replacing it with `execFile`, there's still a risk of flag/argument injection if a user supplies a `repoName` starting with a hyphen (e.g., `-o`).
+**Prevention:** Always use `execFile` or `spawn` instead of `exec` to prevent shell injection. Additionally, validate that user inputs passed as positional arguments do not start with `-` to prevent argument injection.
diff --git a/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts b/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
index 5ff437b8..96fcaf49 100644
--- a/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
+++ b/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 import type { APIRoute } from 'astro';
-import { exec } from 'node:child_process';
+import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
 import util from 'node:util';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import { getReposRootResolved } from '../../lib/forge-repos';
 import { getConfig } from '../../lib/config-db';
 
-const execPromise = util.promisify(exec);
+const execFileAsync = util.promisify(execFile);
 
 export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
   try {
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
       return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'repoUrl et repoName requis' }), { status: 400 });
     }
 
+    // 🛡️ Security: Prevent flag injection by ensuring repoName doesn't start with a hyphen
+    if (repoName.startsWith('-')) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Nom de dépôt invalide' }), { status: 400 });
+    }
+
     const githubToken = await getConfig('githubToken', true);
     if (!githubToken || githubToken.trim() === '') {
       return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Jeton GitHub manquant' }), { status: 400 });
@@ -33,7 +38,8 @@ export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
     const authUrl = repoUrl.replace('https://', `https://oauth2:${githubToken}@`);
 
     // Clone the repository
-    const { stdout, stderr } = await execPromise(`git clone ${authUrl} ${repoName}`, { cwd: reposRoot });
+    // 🛡️ Security: Use execFile to prevent command injection
+    const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync('git', ['clone', authUrl, repoName], { cwd: reposRoot });
 
     // Try to auto-sync it into the database
     try {