[static-analysis] Report - 2026-04-12

[github-actions]

Analysis Summary

Static analysis scan completed on 2026-04-12 across all agentic workflows in github/gh-aw.

• Tools Used: zizmor, poutine, actionlint, runner-guard
• Total Findings: 4,440
• Workflows Scanned: 187
• Workflows Compiled: 187 (0 compilation errors)
• Run: §24314776288

Findings by Tool

Tool	Total	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Info/Note
zizmor (security)	4,312	0	1	4,207	21	84
poutine (supply chain)	22	0	0	0	1	15 + 6 errors
actionlint (linting)	106	—	—	—	—	—
runner-guard (taint)	0	0	0	0	0	0

Clustered Findings by Tool and Type

Zizmor Security Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
secrets-outside-env	Medium	4,206	All 187 workflows
secrets-inherit	Medium	1	smoke-call-workflow
github-env	High	1	dev-hawk
template-injection	Informational	84	28 workflows
obfuscation	Low	21	21 workflows

Poutine Supply Chain Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
untrusted_checkout_exec	error	6	smoke-workflow-call, smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs
pr_runs_on_self_hosted	warning	1	smoke-copilot-arm
github_action_from_unverified_creator_used	note	8	copilot-token-audit, smoke-codex, link-check, mcp-inspector, copilot-setup-steps, copilot-token-optimizer, super-linter
unverified_script_exec	note	5	copilot-token-audit, copilot-setup-steps, copilot-token-optimizer, smoke-workflow-call, smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs
unpinnable_action	note	2	daily-perf-improver/action, daily-test-improver/action

Actionlint Linting Issues

Issue Type	Count	Affected Workflows
permissions: unknown copilot-requests scope	95	48 workflows
expression: undefined property	11	4 workflows (ace-editor, smoke-claude, smoke-workflow-call, smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs)

Runner-Guard Taint Analysis

Runner-Guard Score: N/A — 0 findings detected. No source-to-sink vulnerabilities found this run.

Top Priority Issues

1. github-env — Dangerous Environment File Usage (High)

• Tool: zizmor
• Count: 1
• Severity: High
• Affected: dev-hawk (line 1323 in compiled YAML)
• Description: A run: step writes to $GITHUB_ENV in a way zizmor flags as potentially unsafe. If the value derives from attacker-influenced input, it enables environment variable injection across subsequent steps.
• Impact: Potential privilege escalation or secret exfiltration via injected environment variables
• Reference: (docs.zizmor.sh/redacted)

2. untrusted_checkout_exec — Arbitrary Code from Checkout (poutine error)

• Tool: poutine
• Count: 6
• Severity: error
• Affected: smoke-workflow-call, smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs
• Description: Detected bash execution on code from a checked-out repo (not ignored via # poutine:ignore). These are likely test workflows where this is acceptable, but the findings remain.
• Impact: Risk of arbitrary code execution if an untrusted fork modifies the executed scripts
• Reference: https://github.com/nicowillis/poutine

3. copilot-requests: write — Unknown Permission Scope (actionlint error)

• Tool: actionlint
• Count: 95
• Severity: error
• Affected: 48 workflows
• Description: copilot-requests is not a recognized GitHub Actions permission scope in actionlint's schema. This is likely a newer/custom permission not yet in actionlint's built-in list.
• Impact: Actionlint validation failures in CI (not a runtime error — this permission works correctly at runtime)
• Reference: https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/blob/main/docs/checks.md#check-permissions

Fix Suggestion for github-env (High Severity)

Issue: Dangerous use of $GITHUB_ENV environment file
Severity: High
Affected Workflows: 1 (dev-hawk)

Prompt to Copilot Agent:

You are fixing a High-severity security vulnerability identified by zizmor in `.github/workflows/dev-hawk.md`.

**Vulnerability**: Dangerous use of environment file (`$GITHUB_ENV`)
**Rule**: github-env — (docs.zizmor.sh/redacted)
**Location**: Around line 1323 in the compiled dev-hawk.lock.yml (step id: ghes-host-config)

**Why it's dangerous**:
Writing to `$GITHUB_ENV` from a `run:` step can allow environment variable injection
if the written value is not strictly validated. An attacker who controls the input
source could inject newlines to smuggle additional KEY=VALUE pairs, affecting later steps.

**Required Fix** — choose the safest option:

Option A: Validate value before writing to $GITHUB_ENV
```yaml
- name: Configure GH host
  id: ghes-host-config
  shell: bash
  run: |
    GH_HOST=$(echo "$GITHUB_SERVER_URL" | sed 's|https://||' | tr -d '\n\r')
    if [[ ! "$GH_HOST" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ ]]; then
      echo "::error::Unexpected GH_HOST value: $GH_HOST"
      exit 1
    fi
    echo "GH_HOST=$GH_HOST" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"

Option B: Use step output instead of $GITHUB_ENV

- name: Configure GH host
  id: ghes-host-config
  shell: bash
  run: |
    GH_HOST=$(echo "$GITHUB_SERVER_URL" | sed 's|https://||' | tr -d '\n\r')
    echo "gh_host=$GH_HOST" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

Then reference it in subsequent steps as $\{\{ steps.ghes-host-config.outputs.gh_host }}.

Please apply the appropriate fix to .github/workflows/dev-hawk.md.

### All Findings Details

<details>
<summary>Expression Errors (actionlint) — 4 Workflows</summary>

#### ace-editor
- Line 594: `needs.activation.outputs.activated` — property `activated` not defined in activation outputs type

#### smoke-claude
- Line 864, 2468: `needs.activation.outputs.artifact_prefix` — property `artifact_prefix` not defined

#### smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs
- Lines 122–125: `job.workflow_repository`, `job.workflow_sha`, `job.workflow_ref`, `job.workflow_file_path` — these properties are not in actionlint's `job` type schema (likely newer GitHub Actions features)

#### smoke-workflow-call
- Lines 125–128: Same `job.*` properties as above

</details>

<details>
<summary>Template Injection Findings (zizmor Informational) — 28 Workflows</summary>

Informational-level template injection findings were detected in 28 workflows including:
ai-moderator, auto-triage-issues, contribution-check, daily-doc-updater, daily-issues-report, discussion-task-miner, grumpy-reviewer, issue-arborist, issue-monster, issue-triage-agent, org-health-report, plan, pr-triage-agent, q, refiner, scout, smoke-agent-all-merged, smoke-agent-all-none, smoke-agent-public-approved, smoke-agent-public-none, and more.

These are classified Informational (not High) in today's scan, indicating they do not directly interpolate untrusted data into shell commands without sanitization.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Poutine Unverified Action Usage</summary>

Workflows using GitHub Actions from unverified creators (pinned to SHA but creator not GitHub-verified):
- `astral-sh/setup-uv` — copilot-token-audit, copilot-setup-steps, copilot-token-optimizer, mcp-inspector
- `actions-ecosystem/action-add-labels` — smoke-codex
- `gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check` — link-check
- `super-linter/super-linter` — super-linter

Script execution from external URLs (curl | bash pattern):
- `copilot-token-audit`, `copilot-setup-steps`, `copilot-token-optimizer` — install-gh-aw.sh from raw.githubusercontent.com
- `smoke-workflow-call`, `smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs` — bash scripts from checked-out repo

</details>

### Historical Trends

| Date | Total | Zizmor | Poutine | Actionlint | Runner-Guard |
|------|-------|--------|---------|------------|--------------|
| 2026-03-29 | 7,383 | 3,455 | — | 3,928 | — |
| 2026-04-03 | 9,757 | 4,789 | 39 | 4,929 | — |
| 2026-04-10 | 4,379 | 4,051 | 22 | 306 | 0 |
| 2026-04-11 | 4,287 | 4,135 | 22 | 130 | 0 |
| **2026-04-12** | **4,440** | **4,312** | **22** | **106** | **0** |

**Change vs yesterday**: +153 total (+3.6%)

**Improvements since yesterday**:
- ✅ shellcheck: 24 → 0 (resolved)
- ✅ artipacked: 2 → 0 (resolved)

**Regressions since yesterday**:
- ⚠️ secrets-outside-env: 4,027 → 4,206 (+179, likely new workflows added)

**Long-term trend**: Significant reduction from the 9,757 peak on 2026-04-03. The large drop in actionlint from 4,000+ to 106 reflects a schema/compilation fix deployed around 2026-04-10.

### Recommendations

1. **Immediate**: Fix the `github-env` High severity finding in `dev-hawk` (use the fix prompt above)
2. **Short-term**: Add `# poutine:ignore untrusted_checkout_exec` to the remaining un-suppressed findings in `smoke-workflow-call` and `smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs` if they are intentional test behaviors
3. **Monitor**: Track the +179 increase in `secrets-outside-env` findings — likely from newly added workflows, but confirm no accidental secret expansion
4. **Long-term**: Investigate actionlint's `copilot-requests` permission scope warning; consider adding an actionlint config override if this is a deliberate non-standard permission

### Next Steps

- [ ] Apply `github-env` fix in `dev-hawk.md`
- [ ] Review `smoke-workflow-call` and `smoke-workflow-call-with-inputs` for poutine suppression
- [ ] Confirm `secrets-outside-env` +179 increase is from new workflows (not a security regression)
- [ ] Verify `copilot-requests` permission is intentional and update actionlint config if needed

**References:**
- [§24314776288](https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/24314776288) — Current run
- [§24290033455](https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/24290033455) — Previous run (2026-04-11)
- [§24260816813](https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/24260816813) — 2026-04-10




> Generated by [Static Analysis Report](https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/24314776288/agentic_workflow) · ● 371K · [◷](https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Agithub%2Fgh-aw+is%3Aissue+%22gh-aw-workflow-call-id%3A+github%2Fgh-aw%2Fstatic-analysis-report%22&type=issues)
> - [x] expires <!-- gh-aw-expires: 2026-04-19T19:47:36.903Z --> on Apr 19, 2026, 7:47 PM UTC

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