diff --git a/.github/custom-security-categories.txt b/.github/custom-security-categories.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df9d69b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/custom-security-categories.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+**WordPress & Laravel Integration Security:**
+- Unsafe use of raw SQL queries (DB::select, DB::raw, $wpdb->query) with unsanitized user input instead of parameterized queries or Eloquent ORM
+- Missing WordPress sanitization functions (sanitize_text_field, esc_html, esc_attr, wp_kses) on user-supplied data rendered in templates
+- Improper use of WordPress nonces or missing CSRF validation on custom form handlers outside Laravel middleware
+- Direct access to superglobals ($_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST) without validation in WordPress filters, actions, or ACF hooks
+- Insecure use of update_option(), update_post_meta(), or update_user_meta() with unvalidated input
+- Missing capability checks (current_user_can) before performing privileged operations in custom endpoints or AJAX handlers
+- WordPress REST API endpoints exposing sensitive data without proper authentication or permission callbacks
+
+**Dutch Municipal Data & Privacy (BIO/AVG/GDPR):**
+- BSN (Burgerservicenummer) stored in plaintext or logged without hashing — must always use irreversible hashing (see BsnHasher trait)
+- Personal citizen data (name, address, BSN, IBAN) exposed in API responses, logs, or error messages
+- Missing data minimization — collecting or returning more personal data than necessary for the operation
+- Citizen data transmitted over unencrypted channels or without TLS verification
+- Missing or inadequate access controls on pages or endpoints handling citizen information (WOO requests, permits, registrations)
+- Gravity Forms submissions containing personal data without proper access restrictions on entries
+- Missing data retention limits or automatic cleanup for citizen data stored in WordPress
+
+**External API & Integration Security:**
+- Hardcoded API credentials or tokens instead of using environment variables for OpenPub, OpenPDC, or OpenWOO clients
+- Missing SSL/TLS certificate verification (verify => false) on Guzzle HTTP client calls to external services
+- External API responses rendered without output escaping, enabling stored XSS via upstream data
+- Missing error handling on external API calls that could leak internal system details (hostnames, credentials, stack traces)
+- SSRF vulnerabilities through user-controllable URLs passed to HTTP clients
+- Missing timeout configuration on external API requests that could cause denial of service
+
+**Elasticsearch Security:**
+- Elasticsearch credentials (host URL with embedded username:password) exposed in client-side code, logs, or error output
+- Elasticsearch queries constructed with unsanitized user input allowing query injection
+- Elasticsearch indices exposing sensitive citizen data without proper access control
+- Missing input length limits on search queries that could cause resource exhaustion
+
+**Secrets & Configuration Exposure:**
+- Secrets, API keys, or license keys committed to version control or hardcoded in source files
+- WordPress debug mode (WP_DEBUG_DISPLAY) enabled in production or staging configurations
+- Sensitive environment variables (database credentials, API keys, license keys) exposed through phpinfo(), debug endpoints, or error pages
+- WordPress salts and authentication keys not properly configured or rotated
+- Deployment configuration (deploy.php) exposing internal server hostnames or paths
+
+**Content Security Policy & Header Integrity:**
+- CSP nonce injection bypassed or missing on dynamically inserted scripts or styles
+- Inline event handlers (onclick, onload) without proper CSP nonce coverage
+- Missing security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) on custom API routes that bypass the SecureHeaders middleware
+- Overly permissive CORS configuration allowing unauthorized cross-origin access
+
+**WordPress Plugin & Dependency Risks:**
+- Known vulnerable versions of WordPress plugins (Gravity Forms, ACF Pro, Wordfence) without update paths
+- Custom plugin code using deprecated or insecure WordPress functions (mysql_query, create_function, extract)
+- Unvalidated file uploads through Gravity Forms or ACF file fields without type/size restrictions
+- User Switching plugin misuse allowing privilege escalation without audit logging
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.github/false-positive-filtering.txt b/.github/false-positive-filtering.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7250a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/false-positive-filtering.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+HARD EXCLUSIONS - Automatically exclude findings matching these patterns:
+
+SIGNAL QUALITY CRITERIA - For remaining findings, assess:
+
+PRECEDENTS - Specific guidance for common security patterns in your environment:
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-code-security-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-code-security-review.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a235c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-code-security-review.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name: Security Review
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write  # Needed for leaving PR comments
+  contents: read
+
+on:
+  - workflow_call
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  security:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
+          fetch-depth: 2
+
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-security-review@main
+        with:
+          claude-api-key: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_API_KEY }}
+          comment-pr: true
+          run-every-commit: true
+          custom-security-scan-instructions: .github/custom-security-categories.txt
+          false-positive-filtering-instructions: .github/false-positive-filtering.txt