e2a is an authenticated email gateway. A vulnerability in this codebase can affect every deployment that uses it — including the ability to forge signed X-E2A-Auth-* headers, bypass HITL approval gates, exfil inbound mail, or spoof agent identity. We take that responsibility seriously and ask that you report issues privately rather than in public GitHub issues.

For what e2a stores, how long it lives, log handling, and the user/operator data-rights surface, see docs/data-handling.md.

Email security@mnexa.ai with:

• A description of the issue
• Steps to reproduce (or a proof-of-concept)
• The version / commit you observed it on (run e2a -version or check VERSION in the repo)
• Any mitigations you suggest

You can also use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting to file a draft advisory directly against this repo.

We aim to:

• Acknowledge receipt within 3 business days
• Provide a substantive response (preliminary assessment + next steps) within 7 business days
• Ship a fix for confirmed high-severity issues within 30 days, faster when active exploitation is plausible

We will credit reporters in the release notes unless you ask to remain anonymous. We don't currently run a paid bounty program.

The project is pre-1.0; we maintain only the most recent release line. Self-hosters running pinned versions should plan to upgrade promptly when an advisory is published.

In scope (please report):

• Authentication bypass — anything that lets an unauthenticated caller reach an authenticated endpoint, or that lets one user act as another
• Forging or replaying X-E2A-Auth-* headers (HMAC, timestamp, body hash) without knowing the signing secret
• Bypassing HITL approval (sending an outbound message that should have been held for review)
• SPF/DKIM verification flaws (causing inbound mail to be marked verified when it shouldn't, or vice versa)
• SSRF in webhook delivery, OAuth callback handling, or any other outbound HTTP path
• Privilege escalation across users, agents, or domains
• SQL injection, command injection, path traversal
• Memory-safety issues in the Go server (e.g. in the SMTP parser)
• Cryptographic flaws (HMAC misuse, weak random, predictable IDs)

Out of scope:

• Deployments running with the example change-me-in-production HMAC secret (the server refuses to start with it; reaching this state requires deliberate misconfiguration)
• Lack of features (e.g. "no rate limit on X" — open an issue or PR)
• Vulnerabilities in dependencies that don't have a reachable code path through e2a (please file with the upstream project)
• Issues only reproducible against agents.e2a.dev infrastructure rather than the OSS code (those go to the hosted-product security team via the same email)
• Email deliverability complaints, spam filter behavior

Once a fix is merged and released, we will publish a GitHub Security Advisory describing the issue, affected versions, and remediation. We ask that reporters hold public disclosure until the advisory is published or 90 days after first contact, whichever is sooner.

We don't pay bounties yet. If you'd like recognition beyond credit in the advisory — a public thanks on the website, a swag pack — say so in your initial report and we'll do our best.