🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in docker logs API

[bobdivx]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection where unsanitized user query parameters (id and tail) were directly concatenated into a shell command (docker logs --tail ${tail} ${containerId}) and executed using execSync.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could inject arbitrary bash commands using &, ;, or | operators to execute malicious code on the host machine.
🔧 Fix: Used execFile wrapped with util.promisify to execute docker directly, avoiding the bash shell, passing arguments as an array. Added flag injection checks and error sanitization.
✅ Verification: Ensure tests pass and the logs endpoint correctly fetches standard docker logs while discarding injected commands.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 10186215259954644985 started by @bobdivx

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
forge	Ready	Preview, Comment	May 12, 2026 5:27pm

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[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request addresses a critical command injection vulnerability in the docker-logs API by replacing execSync with execFile and using argument arrays. It also introduces validation for the containerId to prevent flag injection and sanitizes error messages to avoid leaking system details. Feedback was provided to cap the tail parameter to a maximum value to prevent potential resource exhaustion or buffer overflows.

[gemini-code-assist]

The tail parameter is parsed but not capped. An excessively large value could lead to high memory usage or cause the execFile buffer to overflow (the default limit is 1MB). Enforcing a maximum limit improves API stability and prevents potential resource exhaustion.

Suggested change

	const tailParsed = parseInt(tailRaw, 10);
	const tailStr = isNaN(tailParsed) || tailParsed < 0 ? '100' : tailParsed.toString();
	const tailParsed = parseInt(tailRaw, 10);
	const tailStr = isNaN(tailParsed) || tailParsed < 0 ? '100' : Math.min(tailParsed, 1000).toString();