feat(crypto): support Ed25519/EdDSA in COSE parser for WebAuthn

[sea-snake]

Problem

The IC's COSE parser at rs/crypto/internal/crypto_lib/basic_sig/cose/src/lib.rs only accepts ECDSA-P256 (kty=EC2, alg=ES256) and RSA-PKCS1-SHA256 (kty=RSA, alg=RS256) keys. WebAuthn authenticators that produce kty=OKP, alg=EdDSA, crv=Ed25519 keys (e.g. NitroKey 3A) are rejected with the misleading error:

Invalid delegation: Invalid public key: Algorithm Unspecified not supported: Algorithm not supported in COSE parser

The "Unspecified" comes from the wrapper at parse_cose_public_key, which hardcodes AlgorithmId::Unspecified for any AlgorithmNotSupported outcome — so the actual EdDSA alg value never surfaces.

Why Ed25519 recovery phrases work but Ed25519 WebAuthn keys don't

The IC already has full Ed25519 support for non-WebAuthn keys. Recovery phrases in Internet Identity generate raw Ed25519 keys that are DER-encoded with the standard Ed25519 algorithm identifier (RFC 8410, OID 1.3.101.112). These take the ed25519_algorithm_identifier() path in user_public_key_from_bytes and are verified via verify_basic_sig_by_public_key(AlgorithmId::Ed25519, ...) with a plain signature — no WebAuthn envelope, no COSE parsing.

WebAuthn authenticators like the NitroKey 3A take a different code path: the public key is COSE-encoded and DER-wrapped with the IC's COSE OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.56387.1.1). This hits the cose_algorithm_identifier() branch, which calls parse_cose_public_key — and that parser only knew ECDSA-P256 and RSA-SHA256. The Ed25519 cryptographic primitives were always there; the COSE parser just never learned to unwrap Ed25519/EdDSA keys from the COSE map format that WebAuthn produces.

This was reported via dfinity/internet-identity#3835 with a captured COSE key from a NitroKey 3A. The captured key has only the standard 4 COSE map entries (no key_ops or other extension fields), confirming the root cause is the parser's algorithm allowlist, not extra entries.

Changes

cose crate

• Add CosePublicKey::Ed25519(Vec<u8>) variant.
• Add parse_eddsa_ed25519 helper that decodes kty=OKP / alg=EdDSA / crv=Ed25519 / x=<32 bytes> and returns the RFC 8410 SPKI DER via ic_ed25519::PublicKey::deserialize_raw().serialize_rfc8410_der().
• Wire the new branch into CosePublicKey::from_cbor.
• Add ic-ed25519 to the crate's Cargo.toml and BUILD.bazel.

ic-crypto-standalone-sig-verifier

• Add KeyBytesContentType::Ed25519PublicKeyDerWrappedCose.
• Map AlgorithmId::Ed25519 to it in cose_key_bytes_content_type.

ic-validator

• ingress_validation.rs: include Ed25519PublicKeyDerWrappedCose in the WebAuthn signature path (both in validate_signed_request and validate_signed_delegation).
• webauthn.rs: add an AlgorithmId::Ed25519 arm to basic_sig_from_webauthn_sig. Per WebAuthn §6.5.6, EdDSA WebAuthn signatures are 64 raw bytes (no DER wrapping) — they pass through unchanged.

Tests

• cose/tests/tests.rs: parsing of the RFC 8032 TEST 1 keypair as a COSE key, end-to-end signature verification through the parsed DER, parsing of the captured NitroKey 3A WebAuthn key, rejection of crv=Ed448 and short-x malformed keys.
• validator/src/webauthn.rs: a new ed25519 test module mirroring the existing ecdsa and rsa modules, with a valid-signature, wrong-message, and malformed-signature test. Updates the existing should_return_error_if_algorithm_id_is_not_supported test (which previously asserted Ed25519 was unsupported) to use AlgorithmId::EcdsaSecp256k1 instead.

Verification

cargo test -p ic-crypto-internal-basic-sig-cose -p ic-crypto-standalone-sig-verifier -p ic-validator
cargo clippy --all-features --tests -p ic-crypto-internal-basic-sig-cose -p ic-crypto-standalone-sig-verifier -p ic-validator -- -D warnings -D clippy::all

All clean locally. Bazel build/test was not run in the development environment — please verify in CI.

Related

• fix(fe): export COSE debug data from passkey test on self-service page internet-identity#3835 — diagnostic flow that captured the COSE key from a NitroKey 3A and confirmed the parse failure.

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

This PR extends the IC’s WebAuthn COSE public-key parsing/verification pipeline to accept Ed25519 (COSE kty=OKP, alg=EdDSA, crv=Ed25519) in addition to the existing ECDSA-P256 and RSA-SHA256 support, enabling authenticators that emit Ed25519 COSE keys (e.g., NitroKey 3A).

Changes:

• Add Ed25519/EdDSA parsing to the COSE key parser and return RFC 8410 SPKI DER for the embedded key.
• Thread a new COSE-wrapped Ed25519 key content type through ic-crypto-standalone-sig-verifier and ic-validator to route such keys through the WebAuthn verification path.
• Add end-to-end tests for parsing and verifying Ed25519 WebAuthn signatures, plus negative cases for unsupported curves/malformed keys/signatures.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 7 out of 8 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
rs/crypto/internal/crypto_lib/basic_sig/cose/src/lib.rs	Add COSE OKP/EdDSA/Ed25519 parsing and map it to AlgorithmId::Ed25519 + RFC 8410 DER output.
rs/crypto/internal/crypto_lib/basic_sig/cose/tests/tests.rs	Add COSE Ed25519 parsing + verification tests (including NitroKey capture and malformed/unsupported inputs).
rs/crypto/internal/crypto_lib/basic_sig/cose/Cargo.toml	Add ic-ed25519 dependency for Ed25519 key decoding/DER serialization.
rs/crypto/internal/crypto_lib/basic_sig/cose/BUILD.bazel	Add Bazel dependency on //packages/ic-ed25519.
rs/crypto/standalone-sig-verifier/src/sign_utils.rs	Introduce KeyBytesContentType::Ed25519PublicKeyDerWrappedCose and map Ed25519 COSE-unwrapped keys to it.
rs/validator/src/ingress_validation.rs	Treat Ed25519 COSE-wrapped keys as WebAuthn keys in ingress/delegation validation.
rs/validator/src/webauthn.rs	Accept Ed25519 in WebAuthn signature handling and add validator-level Ed25519 WebAuthn tests.
Cargo.lock	Record the additional ic-ed25519 dependency in the lockfile.

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[sea-snake]

Addressed Copilot review (99ee480):

• Dropped the redundant .clone() — webauthn_sig.signature() already returns an owned Blob, so .0 moves the Vec out without a second allocation.
• Added an explicit 64-byte length check with a clear error message (Invalid Ed25519 signature length: expected 64 bytes, got N), so malformed signatures are caught early in the validator rather than surfacing a generic error from the crypto layer.
• Tightened the malformed-signature test to assert the new error text.

[eichhorl]

Thanks @sea-snake, is there a corresponding interface spec PR?

Some ideas for more tests:

• Extend rs/validator/src/ingress_validation/tests.rs with a test validating Ed25519
• Incorrect public key should be rejected in rs/validator/src/webauthn.rs
• Incorrect signature with correct length should be rejected in rs/validator/src/webauthn.rs
• Parsing of the new Ed25519PublicKeyDerWrappedCose variant in rs/crypto/tests/request_id_signatures.rs
• Extend the rs/tests/crypto/ingress_verification_test.rs system test with the new scheme

[eichhorl]

Not your change, but does this work?

Suggested change

	webauthn_sig: &WebAuthnSignature,