A governance gateway for AI agents — making every action bounded, auditable, reversible, and explainable.
Works transparently with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, and any MCP-compatible agent. Also supports shell command governance and a language-agnostic HTTP API.
intro-s.mp4
- How It Works
- Core Principles
- Quick Start
- Agent Integrations
- Built-in Policies
- Integration Modes
- Policy Self-Evolution
- Architecture
- Policy DSL Reference
- Built-in Tool Adapters
- Custom Tool Adapters
- Development
- Contributing
- License
Agents never execute tools directly. Every action flows through the control plane for evaluation, enforcement, and audit:
flowchart LR
A["Agent"] -->|"action request"| CP["Control Protocol"]
CP -->|"evaluate against policy"| D{"Decision"}
D -->|"allow"| E["Agent Executes Action"]
D -->|"deny"| F["Blocked + Reason Logged"]
D -->|"gate"| G["Human Approval Required"]
E -->|"record result"| L["Evidence Ledger"]
G -->|"approved"| E
The protocol does not execute actions itself. It evaluates them against a policy, enforces session-level budgets, requires human approval for risky operations, and records everything in a tamper-evident audit ledger.
| Principle | Description |
|---|---|
| Bounded | Agents can only perform allowed actions within allowed scopes |
| Session-Aware | Budget, rate limits, and escalation rules across the full interaction |
| Auditable | Every action logged in a tamper-evident ledger with SHA-256 hash chaining |
| Reversible | Compensation plans for undoing executed actions |
| Explainable | Full reporting — what was allowed, denied, gated, and why |
npm i @det-acp/corenpx det-acp init cursor # Cursor
npx det-acp init codex # Codex CLI
npx det-acp init claude-code # Claude CodeThis generates all required files (policy, MCP config, governance rules) with sensible defaults. Edit policy.yaml to customize — everything else is handled automatically.
# Use your own policy instead of the default
npx det-acp init cursor --policy ./my-policy.yamlAfter running
init, restart your agent to pick up the MCP server.
Create agent.policy.yaml:
version: "1.0"
name: "my-agent"
capabilities:
- tool: "file:read"
scope:
paths: ["./src/**"]
- tool: "file:write"
scope:
paths: ["./src/**"]
- tool: "command:run"
scope:
binaries: ["npm", "node", "tsc"]
limits:
max_runtime_ms: 1800000
max_files_changed: 50
gates:
- action: "file:delete"
approval: "human"
risk_level: "high"
evidence:
require: ["checksums", "diffs"]
format: "jsonl"
forbidden:
- pattern: "**/.env"
- pattern: "rm -rf"
session:
max_actions: 100
max_denials: 10
rate_limit:
max_per_minute: 30
escalation:
- after_actions: 50
require: human_checkin
- after_minutes: 15
require: human_checkinimport { AgentGateway } from '@det-acp/core';
const gateway = await AgentGateway.create({
ledgerDir: './ledgers',
onStateChange: (sessionId, from, to) => console.log(`${from} -> ${to}`),
});
// Create a session
const session = await gateway.createSession('./agent.policy.yaml', {
agent: 'my-coding-agent',
});
// Evaluate an action (does NOT execute it)
const verdict = await gateway.evaluate(session.id, {
tool: 'file:read',
input: { path: './src/index.ts' },
});
if (verdict.decision === 'allow') {
// Execute the action yourself
const content = fs.readFileSync('./src/index.ts', 'utf-8');
// Record the result
await gateway.recordResult(session.id, verdict.actionId, {
success: true,
output: content,
durationMs: 5,
});
}
// Terminate and get report
const report = await gateway.terminateSession(session.id, 'task complete');
console.log(`Allowed: ${report.allowed}, Denied: ${report.denied}`);Ready-to-use guides for popular AI agents. Each integration includes policy, config templates, governance rules, test sandbox, and step-by-step instructions.
| Agent | Integration Mode | Governance Level | Guide |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cursor | MCP Proxy + Cursor Rules | Soft | integrations/cursor/ |
| Codex CLI | MCP Proxy + AGENTS.md + OS Sandbox | Soft + Sandbox | integrations/codex/ |
| Claude Code | MCP Proxy + CLAUDE.md + settings.json | Soft + Semi-Hard | integrations/claude-code/ |
| OpenClaw | HTTP API + Skill + Docker Sandbox | Hard | integrations/openclaw/ |
Governance Levels Explained
- Soft — The LLM is instructed (via rules/instructions files) to prefer governed tools. Effective in practice, but a creative prompt could theoretically bypass it.
- Semi-Hard — Soft instructions combined with the agent's built-in permission system that can deny direct tool access (e.g., Claude Code's
settings.json). - Hard — The agent physically cannot access tools outside the governance layer. Achieved via Docker sandboxing, tool allow/deny lists, or custom agent harnesses.
For any MCP-compatible agent not listed above, see MCP Proxy (General).
Production-ready policies in examples/ — usable out of the box:
| Policy | File | Use Case | Tools Used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coding Agent | coding-agent.policy.yaml |
AI coding agents operating on a project | 13 tools |
| DevOps Deploy | devops-deploy.policy.yaml |
Deployment agents that build, test, and deploy code | 16 tools |
| Video Upscaler | video-upscaler.policy.yaml |
Media processing agents running upscaling pipelines | 11 tools |
| Data Analyst | data-analyst.policy.yaml |
Data analysis agents processing datasets and generating reports | 12 tools |
| Security Audit | security-audit.policy.yaml |
Security scanning agents auditing code and dependencies | 11 tools |
| Infrastructure Manager | infrastructure-manager.policy.yaml |
Infrastructure management agents handling IaC, deployments, and monitoring | 16 tools |
Validate any policy with:
npx det-acp validate ./policy.yaml
| Mode | How It Works | Best For |
|---|---|---|
| MCP Proxy | Transparent proxy between agent and MCP servers | Cursor, Claude Code, any MCP client |
| Shell Proxy | Command wrapper that validates before executing | CLI agents, shell-based workflows |
| HTTP API | REST endpoints for session management | Any language, custom integrations |
| Library SDK | TypeScript API for in-process governance | Custom TypeScript agents |
Works with any MCP-compatible client.
Simplified mode — point at a policy file, auto-configures filesystem backend:
npx det-acp proxy --policy ./policy.yaml
npx det-acp proxy --policy ./policy.yaml --dir /path/to/projectFull config mode
For advanced setups with multiple backends, SSE transport, etc.:
cat > mcp-proxy.config.yaml << 'EOF'
policy: ./agent.policy.yaml
ledger_dir: ./.det-acp/ledgers
transport: stdio
backends:
- name: filesystem
transport: stdio
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "./src"]
EOF
npx det-acp proxy ./mcp-proxy.config.yamlExecute commands through the policy gateway:
npx det-acp exec ./agent.policy.yaml echo "hello" # Allowed
npx det-acp exec ./agent.policy.yaml rm -rf /tmp # Denied (forbidden)npx det-acp serve --port 3100HTTP API Examples
# Create a session
curl -X POST http://localhost:3100/sessions \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"policy": "version: \"1.0\"\nname: test\ncapabilities:\n - tool: file:read\n scope:\n paths: [\"./src/**\"]"}'
# Evaluate an action
curl -X POST http://localhost:3100/sessions/<session-id>/evaluate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"action": {"tool": "file:read", "input": {"path": "./src/index.ts"}}}'
# Record result
curl -X POST http://localhost:3100/sessions/<session-id>/record \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"actionId": "<action-id>", "result": {"success": true, "output": "..."}}'
# Terminate session
curl -X POST http://localhost:3100/sessions/<session-id>/terminatenpx det-acp init <agent> # Set up governance (cursor, codex, claude-code)
npx det-acp init <agent> --policy <file> # Use custom policy
npx det-acp validate <policy-file> # Validate a policy
npx det-acp proxy --policy <policy-file> # Start MCP proxy (simplified)
npx det-acp proxy --policy <policy-file> --evolve # With policy self-evolution
npx det-acp proxy <config-file> # Start MCP proxy (full config)
npx det-acp exec <policy-file> <command> # Execute via shell proxy
npx det-acp report <ledger-file> # View audit report
npx det-acp serve [--port <port>] # Start HTTP session serverWhen an action is denied by the policy, the self-evolution feature can suggest a minimal policy change that would allow it, prompt you for a decision, and optionally update the policy (in memory and/or on disk). This keeps governance strict by default while letting you relax policy incrementally when you approve.
- Analyses denials — Pattern-matches denial reasons (missing capability, path/binary/domain outside scope, forbidden pattern) and produces a single, minimal policy edit.
- Prompts you — Presents the suggestion (e.g. “Add
file:readcapability for path./config/**?”) via the agent’s own chat UI. - Three choices:
- Add to policy — Apply the change to the session’s policy and persist it to the policy YAML file.
- Allow once — Apply the change in memory only for the current session (no disk write).
- Deny — Keep the block; no change.
- Retry — After approval, the agent retries the original tool call against the updated policy.
Budget and session-limit denials (e.g. “Budget exceeded”, “Rate limit exceeded”) are not suggestible; only permission/scope/forbidden denials can trigger evolution.
When running as an MCP proxy (the default for Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex), evolution uses a two-step asynchronous protocol built entirely on standard MCP tool calls — no terminal stdin/stdout required:
- On deny: The proxy returns the denial to the agent with a structured suggestion and a unique
suggestion_id. - On approve: The agent presents the suggestion to the user in chat, collects their decision, and calls
policy_evolution_approvewith thesuggestion_idand decision. - On retry: The proxy applies the policy change. The agent retries the original tool call, which now succeeds.
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Agent as Agent (Cursor / Claude Code)
participant Proxy as MCP Proxy
participant GW as Gateway
Agent->>Proxy: callTool("read_text_file", path)
Proxy->>GW: evaluate()
GW-->>Proxy: deny
Proxy->>Proxy: suggestPolicyChange()
Proxy-->>Agent: Denied + suggestion + suggestionId
Agent->>User: "read_text_file denied. Add capability for path X?"
User-->>Agent: "Yes, add to policy"
Agent->>Proxy: callTool("policy_evolution_approve", suggestionId, "add-to-policy")
Proxy->>Proxy: applyPolicyChange + writePolicyToFile
Proxy-->>Agent: "Policy updated"
Agent->>Proxy: callTool("read_text_file", path)
Proxy->>GW: evaluate()
GW-->>Proxy: allow
Proxy-->>Agent: file contents
This works in every MCP client because it uses only the standard MCP tool-call protocol — no readline, no stdin conflicts.
MCP proxy (simplified mode):
npx det-acp proxy --policy ./policy.yaml --evolveThe
initcommand includes--evolveby default in generated MCP configurations.
Programmatic (library): pass policyEvolution in GatewayConfig for non-MCP setups (e.g. CLI scripts, custom agents):
import { AgentGateway, createCliEvolutionHandler } from '@det-acp/core';
const gateway = await AgentGateway.create({
ledgerDir: './ledgers',
policyEvolution: {
policyPath: './agent.policy.yaml',
handler: createCliEvolutionHandler(),
timeoutMs: 30_000,
},
});You can plug a custom EvolutionHandler (e.g. GUI dialog, webhook) instead of createCliEvolutionHandler().
flowchart LR
subgraph Denial["On Deny"]
A["Action Denied"] --> B["Suggestion Engine"]
B --> C{"Suggestible?"}
C -->|No| D["Keep Deny"]
C -->|Yes| E["PolicySuggestion + ID"]
end
E --> F["Agent presents to user"]
F --> G{"User Decision"}
G -->|Add to policy| H["policy_evolution_approve → Apply + Write YAML"]
G -->|Allow once| I["policy_evolution_approve → Apply in-memory"]
G -->|Deny| D
H --> J["Retry original tool call"]
I --> J
J --> K{"Verdict"}
K -->|allow| L["Proceed"]
K -->|deny| D
The Suggestion Engine maps denial reasons to one of: add capability, widen scope (paths/binaries/domains/methods/repos), or remove a forbidden pattern. In MCP proxy mode, the MCP Evolution Handler returns the suggestion to the agent as a structured denial with a suggestion_id, and the agent calls policy_evolution_approve after collecting the user’s decision. In library mode, the Policy Evolution Manager uses a pluggable handler (CLI, GUI, webhook) with a configurable timeout and re-evaluates the action inline.
graph TB
subgraph External["External Systems"]
BackendMCP["Backend MCP Servers"]
Approvers["Human / Webhook Approvers"]
end
subgraph Integration["Integration Layer"]
subgraph MCPProxyGroup["MCP Proxy Server"]
MCPProxy["MCP Proxy"]
subgraph McpEvo["MCP Evolution (optional)"]
McpEvoHandler["MCP Evolution Handler"]
EvoTool["policy_evolution_approve tool"]
end
end
ShellProxy["Shell Proxy"]
HTTPServer["HTTP Server"]
LibrarySDK["Library SDK"]
end
subgraph Core["Core Engine"]
Gateway["Agent Gateway"]
SessionMgr["Session Manager"]
PolicyEval["Policy Evaluator"]
GateMgr["Gate Manager"]
ActionReg["Action Registry"]
subgraph Evolution["Policy Self-Evolution (optional)"]
EvolutionMgr["Policy Evolution Manager"]
SuggestionEngine["Suggestion Engine"]
end
end
subgraph Infra["Infrastructure"]
Ledger["Evidence Ledger<br/>(JSONL + SHA-256)"]
Rollback["Rollback Manager"]
end
subgraph Tools["Tool Adapters"]
subgraph FileTools["File Operations"]
FR["file:read"]
FW["file:write"]
FD["file:delete"]
FM["file:move"]
FC["file:copy"]
end
subgraph DirTools["Directory Operations"]
DL["directory:list"]
DC["directory:create"]
end
subgraph GitTools["Git Operations"]
GD["git:diff"]
GA["git:apply"]
GC["git:commit"]
GS["git:status"]
end
subgraph NetTools["Network & System"]
CR["command:run"]
HR["http:request"]
ND["network:dns"]
ER["env:read"]
AE["archive:extract"]
end
end
MCPProxy --> Gateway
ShellProxy --> Gateway
HTTPServer --> Gateway
LibrarySDK --> Gateway
Gateway --> SessionMgr
Gateway --> ActionReg
Gateway --> GateMgr
SessionMgr --> PolicyEval
SessionMgr --> GateMgr
SessionMgr --> Ledger
SessionMgr -->|on deny| EvolutionMgr
EvolutionMgr --> SuggestionEngine
MCPProxy -->|on deny| McpEvoHandler
McpEvoHandler --> SuggestionEngine
EvoTool -->|apply change| SessionMgr
ActionReg --> FileTools
ActionReg --> DirTools
ActionReg --> GitTools
ActionReg --> NetTools
Rollback --> ActionReg
Rollback --> Ledger
MCPProxy --> BackendMCP
GateMgr --> Approvers
sequenceDiagram
participant Agent
participant Integration
participant Gateway as Agent Gateway
participant Session as Session Manager
participant Policy as Policy Evaluator
participant Gate as Gate Manager
participant Ledger as Evidence Ledger
Agent ->> Integration: Action request (tool, input)
Integration ->> Gateway: evaluate(sessionId, action)
Gateway ->> Session: evaluate(sessionId, action)
Session ->> Policy: evaluateSessionAction(action)
Note right of Policy: 1. Session state check<br/>2. Rate limits & escalation<br/>3. Forbidden patterns<br/>4. Capability & scope match<br/>5. Budget limits<br/>6. Gate lookup
Policy -->> Session: allow / deny / gate
Session ->> Ledger: append(action:evaluate)
alt Gate required
Session ->> Gate: requestApproval(action, gate)
alt Approved
Gate -->> Session: approved
else Pending
Gate -->> Session: pending
Note over Agent, Gate: Session paused until resolved
end
end
Session -->> Gateway: EvaluateResponse
Gateway -->> Integration: decision + reasons
Integration -->> Agent: allow / deny / gate
alt Allowed
Note over Agent: Executes action externally
Agent ->> Integration: recordResult(actionId, result)
Integration ->> Gateway: recordResult(sessionId, actionId, result)
Gateway ->> Session: recordResult(result)
Session ->> Session: Update budget tracking
Session ->> Ledger: append(action:result)
end
opt Session complete
Agent ->> Integration: terminateSession()
Integration ->> Gateway: terminate(sessionId)
Gateway ->> Session: terminate(sessionId)
Session ->> Ledger: append(session:terminate)
Session -->> Agent: Session Report
end
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> Created: createSession()
Created --> Evaluating: evaluate(action)
Evaluating --> Allowed: policy allows
Evaluating --> Denied: policy denies
Evaluating --> Gated: gate required
Gated --> Allowed: approved
Gated --> Denied: rejected
Allowed --> Recording: recordResult()
Recording --> Evaluating: next action
Denied --> Evaluating: next action
Recording --> Terminated: terminateSession()
Evaluating --> Terminated: terminateSession()
Terminated --> [*]
Every action produces an immutable audit record in JSONL format with SHA-256 hash chaining:
{"seq":1,"ts":"...","hash":"sha256:abc...","prev":"sha256:000...","type":"session:start","data":{...}}
{"seq":2,"ts":"...","hash":"sha256:def...","prev":"sha256:abc...","type":"action:evaluate","data":{...}}
{"seq":3,"ts":"...","hash":"sha256:ghi...","prev":"sha256:def...","type":"action:result","data":{...}}If any entry is tampered with, the hash chain breaks and integrity verification fails.
| Section | Purpose |
|---|---|
capabilities |
Allowed tools and their scoped paths, binaries, or domains |
limits |
Runtime, cost, file change, and retry budgets |
gates |
Actions requiring human or webhook approval |
evidence |
Artifacts that must be recorded (checksums, diffs) |
forbidden |
Patterns that are always blocked |
session |
Max actions, rate limits, escalation rules |
remediation |
Error handling rules and fallback chains |
See examples/ for complete policy files.
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
file:read |
Read files within scoped paths | N/A (read-only) |
file:write |
Write files with backup for rollback | Restores previous content |
file:delete |
Delete files within scoped paths | Restores file from backup |
file:move |
Move/rename files within scoped paths | Moves file back to original location |
file:copy |
Copy files within scoped paths | Removes copied file |
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
directory:list |
List files and directories within scoped paths | N/A (read-only) |
directory:create |
Create directories within scoped paths | Removes created directories |
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
command:run |
Execute allow-listed binaries with timeout | Compensation actions |
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
git:diff |
Get git diff output | N/A (read-only) |
git:apply |
Apply git patches with stash-based rollback | git checkout . && git stash pop |
git:commit |
Stage and commit changes | git reset --soft HEAD~1 |
git:status |
Get working tree status | N/A (read-only) |
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
http:request |
HTTP requests to allow-listed domains | Compensation actions |
network:dns |
DNS lookups for allow-listed domains | N/A (read-only) |
| Tool | Description | Rollback |
|---|---|---|
env:read |
Read environment variables with auto-redaction of secrets | N/A (read-only) |
archive:extract |
Extract tar/zip archives within scoped paths | Removes extracted files |
Extend the ToolAdapter base class to add your own tools:
import { ToolAdapter } from '@det-acp/core';
import { z } from 'zod';
class MyCustomTool extends ToolAdapter {
readonly name = 'custom:mytool';
readonly description = 'My custom tool';
readonly inputSchema = z.object({
target: z.string().min(1),
options: z.record(z.string()).optional(),
});
validate(input, policy) { /* ... */ }
async dryRun(input, ctx) { /* ... */ }
async execute(input, ctx) { /* ... */ }
async rollback(input, ctx) { /* ... */ }
}
// Register it
gateway.getRegistry().register(new MyCustomTool());Every tool adapter follows the execution lifecycle: validate -> dryRun -> (gate check) -> execute -> verify. Each step is recorded in the evidence ledger.
npm install # Install dependencies
npm run lint # Type check (TypeScript strict)
npm test # Run tests (Vitest)
npm run build # BuildContributions are welcome! Please follow these guidelines:
- Fork the repository and create a feature branch
- Follow the coding standards (TypeScript strict, ESM, Zod validation)
- Write tests mirroring
src/structure undertests/ - Run
npm test && npm run lintbefore submitting - Use Conventional Commits for commit messages
- Open a PR with a clear description of changes



