Security Fix: Command Injection Vulnerability in Auto-Updater

[MahmoudMohajer]

Description of Changes

This PR fixes a critical command injection vulnerability in the auto-updater orchestrator where user-controlled commit hashes could execute arbitrary shell commands, leading to remote code execution.

Changes Made

1. Added Commit Hash Validation (_validate_commit_hash())

   • Validates SHA-256 format (7-40 hex characters)
   • Rejects shell metacharacters to prevent injection
   • Provides defense in depth security

2. Enhanced _run_shell_command() Method

   • Now accepts both str and List[str] for flexibility
   • Uses shell=False for list-based commands (safe mode)
   • Maintains backward compatibility for complex shell commands

3. Fixed perform_git_update() Method

   • Added commit hash validation before use
   • Changed from string interpolation to list-based command: ["git", "reset", "--hard", target_commit]
   • Prevents command injection attacks

4. Fixed rollback_git_update() Method

   • Added commit hash validation
   • Changed to safe list-based command construction
   • Prevents command injection attacks

5. Hardened run_setup_scripts() Method

   • Uses shlex.quote() to safely escape file paths
   • Prevents path-based injection attacks

Motivation and Context

The auto-updater orchestrator was vulnerable to command injection when processing commit hashes. If an attacker could control the target_commit or previous_commit parameters (either through repository control or direct method calls), they could inject malicious shell commands.

Attack Scenario:

• Attacker controls git repository or can call methods directly
• Creates commit with hash containing ; rm -rf / or similar
• Auto-updater executes malicious command during update/rollback

Impact: Critical - Remote code execution possible

Testing Performed

Vulnerability Tests

• Created comprehensive test suite (tests/auto_updater/test_command_injection.py)
• Verified vulnerability existed (command injection successful before fix)
• Verified fix prevents injection (command injection blocked after fix)

Validation Tests

• Tested valid commit hash formats (7-40 hex characters)
• Tested invalid commit hashes (too short, contains metacharacters, etc.)
• Verified all edge cases are handled correctly

Test Results

✅ test_vulnerability_exists - Command injection prevented
✅ test_rollback_vulnerability - Rollback command injection prevented  
✅ test_commit_hash_validation - All validation tests passing

All tests pass successfully.

Security Improvements

• Input Validation: All commit hashes validated before use
• Safe Subprocess: List-based commands prevent shell injection
• Defense in Depth: Multiple layers of protection
• Backward Compatibility: Existing safe code paths continue to work

Files Changed

• auto_updater/auto_update/orchestrator.py - Security fixes
• tests/auto_updater/test_command_injection.py - New test file
• tests/auto_updater/__init__.py - New test module

Code Quality

• ✅ Follows repository conventions
• ✅ Uses sensible helper functions (_validate_commit_hash)
• ✅ Clean, readable, maintainable code
• ✅ No unnecessary dependencies (only standard library)
• ✅ Only modified necessary files
• ✅ Proper error handling and logging

Reviewers

@anderdc and @LandynDev

Labels

• bug - Critical security bug fix

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[MahmoudMohajer]

@anderdc can you take a look at this?