fix(workflows): Prevent shell injection in fast-revert workflow#4210
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fix(workflows): Prevent shell injection in fast-revert workflow#4210
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Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation in shell commands to prevent potential script injection attacks. Refs: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/DI-967 Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
This PR fixes a shell injection vulnerability in the
fast-revert.ymlGitHub Actions workflow.Vulnerability
The "comment on failure" step directly interpolates GitHub context values (
${{ github.event.inputs.pr }},${{ github.repository }},${{ github.run_id }}, etc.) inside arun:block. This pattern is flagged by the Semgrep rule yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection.When GitHub context values are interpolated directly into shell commands, a malicious actor could craft input (e.g., a specially crafted PR number or repository name) that breaks out of the intended shell context and executes arbitrary commands.
Fix
Replace direct context interpolation with environment variables. The GitHub context values are safely assigned to
env:variables, which are then referenced as shell variables (e.g.,$GH_TOKEN,$REPO). This prevents shell injection because environment variable expansion does not allow command substitution.References