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1 change: 0 additions & 1 deletion .github/workflows/changelog-preview.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -15,6 +15,5 @@

jobs:
changelog-preview:
if: false
uses: getsentry/craft/.github/workflows/changelog-preview.yml@bae212ca7aec50bb716eafd387c80bcfb28da937 # 2.26.3
secrets: inherit

Check warning on line 19 in .github/workflows/changelog-preview.yml

View check run for this annotation

@sentry/warden / warden: gha-security-review

pull_request_target with secrets: inherit calls external reusable workflow

Enabling this workflow makes it run on every fork PR (including 'edited'/'labeled' events) under `pull_request_target`, which carries the target repo's secrets. It calls `getsentry/craft/.github/workflows/changelog-preview.yml` with `secrets: inherit`, forwarding ALL repository/organization secrets to that external reusable workflow. If the called workflow checks out PR head code, evaluates attacker-controlled inputs (e.g. PR title/body) inside `run:` blocks, or uses any local action that a fork could override, an external attacker opening a fork PR could exfiltrate the inherited secrets. The action is pinned to a full SHA (good), and permissions are constrained to `contents: read`/`pull-requests: write`/`statuses: write`, which limits but does not eliminate blast radius (PR write enables comment-based exfil/poisoning). Verification of `getsentry/craft@bae212c` is required — it is in another repo and out of scope for this review per the skill.
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