osctrl-tls: hardening — constant-time secrets, per-IP enroll rate-limit, audit-log on failed enrolls (round 1b of 3)#816
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…, shared rate-limit + audit-log infra
Server-side hardening for osctrl-api, plus shared infrastructure
(rate-limit package, audit-log helpers, trusted-proxies plumbing)
that osctrl-tls also consumes — its consumer-side changes ship in a
companion PR so the TLS-facing surface can be tested in isolation.
== Auth bedrock ==
cmd/api:
- --auth=jwt is now the default. Refuse to start with --auth=none
unless OSCTRL_INSECURE_NO_AUTH=1 is set. When opted in, a 60s
warning ticker keeps the deployment from drifting into
'auth-off forever'.
- HttpOnly + Secure cookie session for SPA-style clients
(osctrl_token). CLI clients with Authorization: Bearer continue
to work unchanged.
- Double-submit CSRF (osctrl_csrf cookie + X-CSRF-Token header) for
mutating cookie-authenticated requests. CLI Bearer flows exempt.
- JWT signing-algorithm pin (HMAC only) to defeat alg-confusion
attacks (alg:none / RS256-with-HS256-verify).
- JWT secret minimum 32 bytes (HS256 needs HMAC key ≥ hash output).
Startup fails fast with the openssl one-liner if too short.
- Strict 'forwarded headers' trust via --trusted-proxies. Empty
default means utils.GetIP ignores X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP —
an internet attacker can't spoof IPs to defeat rate-limits or
poison audit logs.
== Env secret containment + cross-env defense ==
pkg/types: new TLSEnvironmentView — the low-privilege env projection.
Omits Secret, EnrollSecretPath, RemoveSecretPath, Certificate, Flags,
and every other field that materially contributes to enrolling a node.
cmd/api/handlers/environments.go:
- EnvironmentHandler now branches on access level: AdminLevel (or
super-admin) gets the full storage struct; UserLevel gets the
low-priv view.
- EnvEnrollHandler / EnvRemoveHandler raised from UserLevel to
AdminLevel — both embed the env's enroll/remove secret.
- Both handlers log only the target name, not returnData.
- EnvActionsHandler 'create' branch validates caller-supplied UUID
via EnvUUIDFilter (rejects malformed) and EnvExists (rejects
collision). 'delete' branch gets the same validation for symmetry.
cmd/api/handlers/queries.go: QueryResultsHandler now precheck-validates
the named query belongs to env.ID via h.Queries.Exists(name, env.ID)
and returns 404 otherwise. logging.GetQueryResults filtered on 'name'
only, so without this gate a user with QueryLevel on env A could
pull results from env B by passing B's query name in A's URL.
pkg/environments/environments.go: tighten EnvUUIDFilter regex and add
axis-pure Exists/UUIDExists helpers so handler checks can match the
router's expectations exactly.
== Shared rate-limit + audit-log infrastructure ==
pkg/ratelimit (new): per-key token-bucket rate limiter with idle
eviction. Used by osctrl-api for /login here, and by osctrl-tls for
/enroll in the companion PR. Tunable burst, window, and key
function (KeyByIP today; KeyByIPAndEnv available).
pkg/auditlog/audit.go: FailedLogin + FailedEnroll helpers — a clean
stream of authn/enrol failures for SoC tooling to alert on
brute-force, password-spray, and enroll abuse.
pkg/utils/http-utils.go: SetTrustedProxies + an updated GetIP that
honors the trusted-proxies set. Empty (default) ignores
X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP entirely.
== SQL hardening + carve path safety ==
pkg/carves/utils.go: new ValidCarvePath regexp gate. Without this gate
a CarveLevel operator could pass \`'; SELECT 1; --\` and pivot 'carve
a file' into 'run any SELECT against your fleet' via GenCarveQuery's
string concat.
cmd/api/handlers/carves.go (CarvesRunHandler): path validated before
the SQL splice. Rejected paths return 400.
== Authz + audit-log hardening ==
pkg/users:
- bcrypt cost raised from default (10) to 12. CheckLoginCredentials
opportunistically re-hashes existing users at next login (no
password reset needed). Rehash failure is non-fatal.
- New ClearToken empties APIToken AND CSRFToken so any existing JWT
+ CSRF cookie pair stops validating. Used by future
DELETE /api/v1/users/{username}/token in a follow-up PR.
cmd/api/handlers/{users,settings,environments}.go: authz tightenings
around permission writes, settings PATCH, and env-action service-name
validation.
pkg/environments/env-cache.go: keep the 2h cleanup interval; introduce
an envCacheTTL constant so the value is self-documenting and tunable
locally without changing runtime defaults.
== Defaults + ops ==
deploy/config/{api,admin}.yml: flip --audit-log default to true so
audit log writes are on by default. Operators can disable with
--audit-log=false.
Verified: go build ./... clean, go vet ./... clean, go test ./pkg/...
./cmd/api/... ./cmd/tls/... all green.
…it, audit-log on failed enrolls Carves the osctrl-tls-facing changes out of the original "round 1" security PR (jmpsec#813) into their own PR so the TLS surface can be isolated for review and testing. Depends on the shared infrastructure (pkg/auditlog FailedEnroll, pkg/ratelimit, and utils.SetTrustedProxies / GetIP changes) that lands in jmpsec#813. == Threats addressed == osctrl-tls is the only osctrl service that is internet-facing in a typical deployment — every osquery node POSTs to /enroll, /config, /log, etc. before any authentication exists. That makes its surface the most exposed and the most worth hardening. This PR adds three independent defenses: == 1. Constant-time secret comparison == cmd/tls/handlers/utils.go: checkValidSecret and checkValidRemovePath switched from `strings.TrimSpace(secret) == env.Secret` (byte-by-byte short-circuiting compare) to `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`. The old form leaked secret bytes via response-time timing — an attacker on the open internet could iterate one byte at a time. Constant-time compare eliminates that oracle. == 2. Per-IP rate-limit on /enroll == cmd/tls/main.go: 20 requests/minute per remote IP, idle eviction after 10 minutes. Rejected requests: - return 429 - record an `AuditLog.FailedEnroll(ip, env, "rate limit exceeded", 0)` so SoC tooling can alert on enroll abuse / spray. Backed by pkg/ratelimit (from jmpsec#813). The default 20/min easily covers any realistic enroll burst (a wave of provisioning at site bring-up) while shutting down brute-force / DoS attempts. == 3. Audit-log on failed enrollment == cmd/tls/handlers/handlers.go: HandlersTLS grows an AuditLog field + WithAuditLog option. Defensive default is a disabled manager so handler code can call h.AuditLog.FailedEnroll(...) without nil checks. cmd/tls/handlers/post.go: EnrollHandler records FailedEnroll on the invalid-secret path. Combined with the rate-limit failures above, the audit log now carries the full picture of unwanted enroll traffic. cmd/tls/main.go: initializes auditlog.CreateAuditLogManager and threads it into handlers via WithAuditLog. Service name "osctrl-tls" flows through to audit rows. == 4. Trusted-proxies plumbing == cmd/tls/main.go: reads flagParams.Service.TrustedProxies (CIDR list) and calls utils.SetTrustedProxies before any request can reach GetIP. Empty default means GetIP ignores X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP and uses RemoteAddr — preventing internet-side header-spoofed bypass of the rate-limiter or audit-log poisoning. == Config == deploy/config/tls.yml: - auditLog: true (on by default; was false) - trustedProxies: "" (empty by default; operators behind a trusted reverse proxy can list the proxy CIDRs) Verified: go build ./... clean, go vet ./... clean, go test ./cmd/tls/... green. Live smoke on the dev stack: 4 osquery nodes enrolled, the audit_logs table records `enroll_failure` rows with correct IPs for forced bad-secret attempts.
javuto
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Carves the osctrl-tls-facing changes out of #813 into their own PR, as requested in #813 (comment), so the TLS surface can be reviewed and tested in isolation.
What this changes
5 files in
cmd/tls/+deploy/config/tls.yml. Three independent defenses on the only osctrl service that is internet-facing in a typical deployment:1. Constant-time secret comparison
cmd/tls/handlers/utils.go—checkValidSecretandcheckValidRemovePathusesubtle.ConstantTimeCompareinstead of the previous byte-by-byte short-circuiting compare. Removes a response-time timing oracle on the public enroll endpoint.2. Per-IP rate-limit on
/enrollcmd/tls/main.go— 20 req/min per remote IP, idle eviction after 10 min, backed bypkg/ratelimit(from #813). Rejected requests:429AuditLog.FailedEnroll(ip, env, "rate limit exceeded", 0)so SoC tooling can alert3. Audit-log on failed enrollment
cmd/tls/handlers/handlers.go—HandlersTLSgains anAuditLogfield +WithAuditLogoption; defensive default is a disabled manager so handler code can callh.AuditLog.FailedEnroll(...)without nil-checks.cmd/tls/handlers/post.go—EnrollHandlerrecordsFailedEnrollon the invalid-secret path.cmd/tls/main.go— initializesauditlog.CreateAuditLogManagerand threads it viaWithAuditLog. Service nameosctrl-tlsflows through.4. Trusted-proxies plumbing
cmd/tls/main.go— readsflagParams.Service.TrustedProxies(CIDR list) and callsutils.SetTrustedProxiesbefore any request reachesGetIP. Empty default =GetIPignoresX-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP, preventing internet-side header-spoofed bypass of the rate-limiter or audit-log poisoning.Config
deploy/config/tls.yml:auditLog: true(on by default; wasfalse)trustedProxies: ""(empty default; operators behind a trusted reverse proxy can list CIDRs)Verified
go build ./...cleango vet ./...cleango test ./cmd/tls/...greenaudit_logsrecordsenroll_failurerows with correct IPs for forced bad-secret attemptsTest plan
trustedProxiesempty, confirmX-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4doesn't overrideRemoteAddrinaudit_logsenroll_failureaudit-log row with the source IP