ci: declare minimum permissions on fork-preview-deploy workflow#1714
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arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
ci: declare minimum permissions on fork-preview-deploy workflow#1714arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
arpitjain099
requested a deployment
to
fork-preview-protection
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Declares a top-level
permissionsblock on.github/workflows/fork-preview-deploy.ymlwith the two scopes the workflow actually uses:actions: read(theactions/download-artifactstep pulling from anotherworkflow_runviarun-id, and thegithub-scriptstep callinglistJobsForWorkflowRun) andcontents: write(thecreateDispatchEventAPI call that triggers the deploy). The workflow runs onworkflow_runwhich executes in the default-branch context with full repo-level token access by default; pinning here keeps that authority bounded.This is defense-in-depth grounded in CVE-2025-30066 (the March 2025
tj-actions/changed-filessupply-chain attack). A compromised third-party action can exfiltrateGITHUB_TOKENfrom workflow logs, and the leaked token retains whatever scope it was issued with.workflow_runtriggers are particularly attractive because they run trusted and inherit the default scope. The in-file declaration also gives drift protection if the org default ever widens and is what OpenSSF Scorecard's Token-Permissions check credits.YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.