orb-jobs-agent/v0.0.0-beta.28

chore(hil): bump orb-hil to beta 27 (#1187)

orb-jobs-agent/v0.0.0-b8f884e

chore(hil): bump orb-hil to beta 27 (#1187)

orb-connd/v0.1.1-b8f884e

chore(hil): bump orb-hil to beta 27 (#1187)

orb-hil/v0.0.2-tmp.57

feat(se050): certificate validation (#1167)

Implements validation of the SE050 certificate file, validating the cert
chain starting from the pinned root NXP certificate.

The only ai-assisted portion of this pr is the contents of
`se050/src/certs/null_params_alg.rs`, and
`se050/example_data/2A66F1B2_bad_signature.crt`

Strictly speaking, actually validating the chip unique cert against the
NXP root of trust isn't necessary since the assumption is that the
backend pins the die-unique cert for a given orb already. But my hope is
that the additional checks against the root cert further harden the
system.

Some limitations (which I think are fine):
* we dont check CRLs when validating the cert chain. This is because
doing so would require networking and greatly complicate the
implementation.

orb-hil/v0.0.2-beta.27

feat(se050): certificate validation (#1167)

Implements validation of the SE050 certificate file, validating the cert
chain starting from the pinned root NXP certificate.

The only ai-assisted portion of this pr is the contents of
`se050/src/certs/null_params_alg.rs`, and
`se050/example_data/2A66F1B2_bad_signature.crt`

Strictly speaking, actually validating the chip unique cert against the
NXP root of trust isn't necessary since the assumption is that the
backend pins the die-unique cert for a given orb already. But my hope is
that the additional checks against the root cert further harden the
system.

Some limitations (which I think are fine):
* we dont check CRLs when validating the cert chain. This is because
doing so would require networking and greatly complicate the
implementation.

orb-hil/v0.0.2-beta.26

feat(se050): certificate validation (#1167)

Implements validation of the SE050 certificate file, validating the cert
chain starting from the pinned root NXP certificate.

The only ai-assisted portion of this pr is the contents of
`se050/src/certs/null_params_alg.rs`, and
`se050/example_data/2A66F1B2_bad_signature.crt`

Strictly speaking, actually validating the chip unique cert against the
NXP root of trust isn't necessary since the assumption is that the
backend pins the die-unique cert for a given orb already. But my hope is
that the additional checks against the root cert further harden the
system.

Some limitations (which I think are fine):
* we dont check CRLs when validating the cert chain. This is because
doing so would require networking and greatly complicate the
implementation.

orb-update-verifier/v0.3.0-838decc

feat(update-agent)!: mark the target slot status UIP (#1176)

Bringing back some of the logic removed in
https://github.com/worldcoin/orb-software/pull/529 :)
Breaking changes:
- Setting the next boot slot, only changes the rootfs status, if that is
`unbootable`. The change is done in order to enable utilizing the other
statuses in EDK & initramfs
- Marking the slot as ok is the only function which sets the status as
`normal` no matter the current status, and it is meant to be used with
`worldcoin-update-verifier`
- Encapsulated the logic of resetting `SR_RF` & the efivars which back
it up in one function. I do not see why it would be seperate

`update-agent` is setting the `rootfs` status in `update-in-progress`.
This will get changed to `update_done` by EDK.
In the next boot, in the happy path, verifier sets everything back to
`normal`

orb-update-agent/v6.0.4-838decc

feat(update-agent)!: mark the target slot status UIP (#1176)

Bringing back some of the logic removed in
https://github.com/worldcoin/orb-software/pull/529 :)
Breaking changes:
- Setting the next boot slot, only changes the rootfs status, if that is
`unbootable`. The change is done in order to enable utilizing the other
statuses in EDK & initramfs
- Marking the slot as ok is the only function which sets the status as
`normal` no matter the current status, and it is meant to be used with
`worldcoin-update-verifier`
- Encapsulated the logic of resetting `SR_RF` & the efivars which back
it up in one function. I do not see why it would be seperate

`update-agent` is setting the `rootfs` status in `update-in-progress`.
This will get changed to `update_done` by EDK.
In the next boot, in the happy path, verifier sets everything back to
`normal`

orb-slot-ctrl/v0.4.0-838decc

feat(update-agent)!: mark the target slot status UIP (#1176)

Bringing back some of the logic removed in
https://github.com/worldcoin/orb-software/pull/529 :)
Breaking changes:
- Setting the next boot slot, only changes the rootfs status, if that is
`unbootable`. The change is done in order to enable utilizing the other
statuses in EDK & initramfs
- Marking the slot as ok is the only function which sets the status as
`normal` no matter the current status, and it is meant to be used with
`worldcoin-update-verifier`
- Encapsulated the logic of resetting `SR_RF` & the efivars which back
it up in one function. I do not see why it would be seperate

`update-agent` is setting the `rootfs` status in `update-in-progress`.
This will get changed to `update_done` by EDK.
In the next boot, in the happy path, verifier sets everything back to
`normal`

orb-hil/v0.0.2-beta.25

chore(hil): add ssh config for the orbs (#1173)

to do `ssh orb` or `scp something orb:~/` from the hil